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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3006
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3217
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 001451 SIPDIS
NOFORN DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
ALSO FOR IO ACTING A/S HOOK, PDAS WARLICK
P FOR DRUSSELL AND RRANGASWAMY
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/SCHEDLBAUER
NSC FOR ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, UNSC, SY, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: UNIIIC COMMISSIONER HAPPY WITH USG
ASSISTANCE BUT SEEKS TWO CRIMINAL ANALYSTS REF: BEIRUT 1348 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (SBU) This is an action request. See paragraph 10. SUMMARY
------- 2. (S/NF) In an October 3 meeting with the Ambassador, Daniel
Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent Investigative
Commission (UNIIIC), was generally pleased with USG
assistance to date, and repeated a single request: that the
USG loan two criminal analysts who would work out of The
Hague (reftel). He expressed his flexibility to make this
work, stressing that these analysts were his priority.
Noting that UNIIIC's mandate will expire at the end of the
year, he said the investigation component will not stop. He
was feeling the deadline pressure, but remarked that the
investigation was moving aggressively. The Special Tribunal
budget is awaiting approval by the Management Committee in
New York, he reported. He did not yet foresee a problem with
approval, but he informed the Ambassador that the UNIIIC
budget was short two to three million dollars and he had
requested approval for a supplementary budget. The FBI would
continue to pay the analysts' salaries, which would be
considered a USG contribution, and UNIIIC would cover travel
and per diem expenses, he suggested. End summary. INVESTIGATION MOVING ALONG;
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE
--------------------------- 3. (S/NF) The Ambassador, accompanied by LegAtt and PolOff,
met Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), at his office in
Monteverde on October 3. A confident Bellemare said he felt
things are bubbling in his investigation and that his
operation was running aggressively like a "police
investigation," while noting that time was running out.
(Note: UNIIIC's mandate will expire on December 31, 2008.
End note.) He expressed a concern about Syria, saying
simply, "We are afraid we may run out of witnesses. Time is
of the essence, but we do not want to strike prematurely." HAPPY WITH USG ASSISTANCE;
REQUESTS CRIMINAL ANALYSTS
--------------------------- 4. (S/NF) LegAtt reported that the USG had responded to
almost all of the outstanding RFAs, but warned that the FBI
may not be able to provide the criminal analysts requested
(reftel). Bellemare inquired what was necessary to make
these individuals available to UNIIIC. Bellemare proposed
that the analysts work out of The Hague, where he said space
was not an issue, on a contract basis. The FBI would
continue to pay the analysts' salaries, which would be
considered a USG contribution, and UNIIIC would cover travel
and per diem expenses, he suggested. 5. (S/NF) Appearing satisfied with USG assistance, Bellemare
said in reference to previous requests for data-mining
analysts, "I would never turn down help. If I have to
prioritize, I need the criminal analysts the most." He said
he hoped for analysts' assistance as soon as possible, to
work until UNIIIC's mandate expires. He inquired whether the
clearance for the new UNIIIC Chief of Investigations, Garry
James Loeppky, was granted for the Intelligence Community
Working Group. 6. (S/NF) While UNIIIC's mandate will expire, he continued,
the investigation will not, implying that he would still need
many of the analysts currently contracted out to UNIIIC. He
noted that he had started contacting organizations to see if
they will agree to transfer their contracted personnel to The
Hague, to which he had received positive responses.
Bellemare said there was a provision in the draft budget for
"internal contractors and secondees." BEIRUT 00001451 002 OF 002 PRESS REPORT "UNHELPFUL"
------------------------ 7. (S/NF) Addressing the October 1 al-Anwar article
purporting that Bellemare will name 120 suspects in his final
report, Bellemare said he had no idea who or how this story
was concocted. He explained that he had to have his new
spokesperson respond to the press report, though he usually
preferred to remain silent. He suggested that the Ambassador
could be helpful in letting political figures know that these
kinds of articles are unhelpful. 8. (S/NF) He said he had visited President Michel Sleiman and
PM Fouad Siniora in the previous month to convey to them that
his investigation would not be tied to a political timetable.
He added that in the coming two months, UNIIIC investigators
would be more visible as they conduct interviews with
political figures. AWAITING BUDGET APPROVAL
------------------------ 9. (S/NF) Bellemare said that he had submitted the operating
budget to the Special Tribunal's Management Committee, and
was now awaiting approval. On UNIIIC's budget, he relayed
that currently he was having internal discussions with the
new UN comptroller on a supplementary budget because he
projected that he will be two or three million dollars short.
It was not a problem yet, he said, but he wanted to make the
Ambassador aware in case the amount was not approved. He
said that he may need USG assistance in pushing for the
supplementary budget's approval. ACTION REQUEST
-------------- 10. (S/NF) Post requests a response to UNIIIC's request that
the USG loan two criminal analysts to interview witnesses, or
information on what response is given to Bellemare. End
Action Request.
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001348 NOFORN
SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, IO/FO-HOOK, WARLICK,
IO/UNP-AMORRISON, L/FO-JBELLINGER, JTHESSIN,
L/AN-LJACOBSON, L/UNA-TBUCHWALD, INR/GGI-MARGULIES,
CIA/CNC-JFINKEL, JBRODERERICK, CIA/CTC-JBEAN, DOJ-JEVY,
USUN-KHALILZAD, WOLFF, SCHEDLBAUER, NSC FOR
ABRAMS/RAMCHAND/YERGER/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINR, UNSC, LE, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: BELLEMARE ANXIOUS FOR MORE USG ASSISTANCE
THAN HE HAS SEEN REF: THE HAGUE 744 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b), (d) SUMMARY
------- 1. (S/NF) In a September 12 meeting with the Ambassador,
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) made three
specific requests for USG assistance and additional requests
for USG action. First, he asked that the USG provide
intelligence information that UNIIIC has formally requested.
Second, that the USG loan UNIIIC two criminal investigators
TDY. UNIIIC needs "investigators who can question a witness"
to interview some 200 persons currently in prison who may
have some relevant information. Third, that the USG urge the
UK to do more to help UNIIIC, particularly with intelligence
information (the UK has provided loaned personnel). 2. (S/NF) In addition, Bellemare asked for USG support when
the Management Committee considers the Tribunal operating
budget on September 25 -- the same day that Lebanese
President Sleiman will meet President Bush in Washington. He
also raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues. Finally he
repeated earlier requests for a USG reaction to 26 sketches
of possible suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG and asked
about getting access to alleged Hizballah defectors
reportedly in the U.S. 3. (S/NF) On other matters, Bellemare said that the GOL has
not asked that UNIIIC investigate the latest political
assassination (the September 10 attack on opposition Druze
member Saleh Aridi). He is concerned about a new
Telecommunication Ministry directive that may impede his
plans for using wiretaps. End Summary. GOL HAS NOT ASKED THAT UNIIIC
INVESTIGATE LATEST ASSASSINATION
-------------------------------- 4. (S/NF) The Ambassador and DCM met on September 12 with
Daniel Bellemare, Commissioner of the UN Independent
International Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), in his
office in Monteverde. The Ambassador asked if UNIIIC would
investigate the case of Saleh Aridi, a Druze political
official assassinated in a car bomb attack near Beirut on
September 10. Bellemare explained that for UNIIIC to take on
a case, first the GOL must ask the UN SYG, then the SYG and
Security Council must approve. He said that the GOL had
shown no indication that it would request that UNIIIC
investigate the Aridi killing. UNIIIC is interested in
finding out more about the Aridi attack, since details are
similar to other cases it is investigating. If it is not
invited to investigate but wants information about a case,
UNIIIC must submit a request to the Lebanese chief
prosecutor. The criteria the GOL uses to decide on
requesting UNIIIC assistance is "a mystery to me" Bellemare
said. (NOTE: The Aridi assassination is the first of a
pro-Syrian politician. END NOTE.) WIRETAPPING
----------- 5. (S/NF) Bellemare was concerned about something he had
learned the day before that might affect wiretapping. The
Telecommunications Ministry had directed two private telecom
companies in Lebanon to inform the Ministry about any
requests for wiretapping. He noted that it is well known
that the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the national police,
conduct wiretapping even though the legal basis for their
authority to do so is weak. The Telecom Ministry's move may
have been directed against the ISF. The order, however, also
could limit the ability of UNIIIC to conduct wiretaps if the
phone companies fear that they will have to report those BEIRUT 00001348 002 OF 003 efforts to the Telecommunications Ministry. 6. (S/NF) The Ambassador asked if Bellemare believed the
action was targeted at UNIIIC, noting that the new
Telecommunications Minister is from the opposition.
Bellemare replied that he was not in a position to say. At
his meeting with PM Fouad Siniora earlier in the week, on
September 8, Siniora told Bellemare to inform him if he runs
into any problems with cooperation from government officials.
He said he might discuss this with the PM if it looks as if
this new telecom directive will be a problem, but first he
will meet with officials of the two telecom companies next
week. The Ambassador offered to support his efforts at
resolving this issue. 7. (S/NF) Bellemare noted that at his August 14 meeting in
The Hague with the USG Interagency Working Group (IWG), he
had asked for USG help with wiretapping capability. He said
that trying to work wiretapping through the Lebanese ISF or
military intelligence would be like "putting the names (of
targets) in the paper". He explained that UN legal experts
were currently looking into the possibility that UNIIIC has
legal authority to carry out wiretaps. Beyond legal
authority for wiretapping, though, Bellemare said he needs
technical capability. ASSISTANCE FROM THE USG
----------------------- 8. (S/NF) Bellemare expressed frustration that USG has not
provided more in response to his requests for assistance, and
noted that he has discussed this with State Department
officials. He outlined three requests for USG assistance for
his investigation. -- One, provide intelligence information that UNIIIC has
formally requested, or inform him that it cannot be provided,
so that he knows not to pursue the requests. -- Two, provide two loaned criminal analysts on TDY. UNIIIC
needs "investigators who can question a witness" to interview
some 200 persons currently in prison who may have some
relevant informtion. -- Three, using USG influence, urge the U government to
provide more to UNIIIC, particulaly regarding intelligence
information. Bellemare said he has requests in to MI-6, but
has not received much. On personnel, Scotland Yard has
provided a loaned investigator. 9. (S/NF) Bellemare showed a good understanding of the
problems associated with complying with the first two
requests from his several meetings with USG officials, but
his frustration was nonetheless evident. "You are the key
player. If the U.S. doesn't help me, who will?" The USG has
"a big investment in the Tribunal" and being more forthcoming
on UNIIIC's requests is a way of making that investment pay
off, he said. 10. (S/NF) During the meeting, Bellemare made several other
requests for USG action: -- USG support when the Committee considers the Tribunal
operating budget, scheduled for September 25, the same day
that Lebanese President Sleiman will meet President Bush in
Washington. He warned that the budget includes high travel
costs, but that these are necessary because of the need for
frequent travel between the Hague and Lebanon. Bellemare
thanked the USG for what he said was a much improved attitude
on the part of the Tribunal Management Committee. His
requests have been more favorably received than was the case
previously. -- He raised the prospect of consultations among the P-5 on a
new resolution to clarify some legal issues. He mused about
the possibility of getting Chapter VII authority for the BEIRUT 00001348 003 OF 003 Tribunal via such a new resolution, but seemed to think that
was not doable in the Council. -- He asked for a reaction to the 26 sketches of possible
suspects that UNIIIC had given the USG. -- Finally, he asked about getting access to alleged
Hizballah defectors reportedly in the U.S., or a definitive
negative response to the request. The answers the USG has
given him so far on this subject, he said, have been not
sufficiently definitive. INTERVIEWS IN SYRIA
------------------- 11. (S/NF) On this issue, Bellemare repeated what he said in
the IWG meeting (reftel): that he did not want to go to Syria
until the USG or other sources had provided names of leads he
should ask to interview and other information. If Syria
denied his request to interview these people, then he would
have evidence of Syrian non-cooperation. Just asking would
give some indication to others in Syria where his
investigation might be headed, which could provoke more
cooperation "if I hit the right person." 12. (S/NF) Bellemare emphasized the urgency for responding
to his request related to Syria, first, because UNIIIC's
mandate and with it Chapter VII authority expires at the end
of the year, and second, the importance of conducting the
interviews before the interviewees disappear by being killed
or other means. OTHER ISSUES: NEW MINISTER OF JUSTICE,
UNIIIC PRESS SPOKESPERSON
------------------------------ 13. (C ) Bellemare said he had a very positive impression of
new GOL Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar, who had told
Bellemare he wanted to be helpful. Najjar's predecessor,
Charles Rizk, was a vocal supporter of the Tribunal but also
known for public criticisms of Bellemare and the previous
Commissioner, Serge Brammertz. Bellemare, a Canadian, noted
that Najjar had taught at McGill University in Montreal and
they had some mutual acquaintances. 14. (SBU) UNIIIC now has a press spokesperson who started
work the week before, Bellemare reported. The official had
good relevant experience as the spokesperson for the
Yugoslavia Tribunal and most recently for the UN Legal
Affairs office. The new spokesperson is currently working up
a strategy for UNIIIC's press interaction. 15. (C) Bellemare said he had been advised by several
persons to not make statements in public that might be seen
as disrupting the current relative calm in Lebanon. He
planned to follow that advice, (NOTE: Bellemare traveled to
Saudi Arabia September 15, we understand. We will seek
further information from UNIIIC contacts. END NOTE.)
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000571 SIPDIS NOFORN
SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PINR, SY, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ANTI-HIZBALLAH SHIA FIGURE TALKS UP
FORMER HIZBALLAH SECRETARY GENERAL TUFAYLI REF: A. BEIRUT 456 B. BEIRUT 554 Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY
------- 1. (C) Independent Shia figure Ahmad Assad argued that former
Hizballah Secretary General Subhi Tufayli is "ready" to join
forces against Hizballah, but that first he needs to have
resolution of criminal charges against him for involvement in
the killing of an LAF officer and a French citizen. (Note:
Tufayli remains on the USG Terrorist Watch List. End note.)
Assad introduced a board member of his anti-Hizballah
political party, Amcit Abdallah Bitar, a prominent
businessman from Shia-dominated Nabatieh in southern Lebanon.
End summary. 2. (C) In preparation for his second trip of the year to the
U.S. to garner support for his anti-Hizballah movement,
independent Shia figure Ahmad Assad introduced a member of
his four-person delegation, Abdallah Bitar, to the Charge on
April 23. Bitar, an Amcit, is the head of the Chamber of
Commerce in the Shia-dominated city of Nabatieh in southern
Lebanon, and recently joined the board of Assad's political
party Lebanese Options Group (LOG) (Ref A). DCM and EmbOffs
also attended the meeting. FORMER HIZBALLAH SECRETARY GENERAL
"READY TO LEAVE"
---------------------------------- 3. (C) Like Lebanese Forces Leader Samir Geagea (ref B),
Assad mentioned the name of former Hizballah Secretary
General Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, arguing that he is "away from
his old rhetoric and ready to leave (his past alliance)" and
the U.S. should work with him. Assad explained that Tufayli
has been accused of giving orders to kill a Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF) officer during the 1990's. Tufayli claims he is
innocent and is ready for a trial, Assad said, but his case
has been shelved despite an outstanding Lebanese warrant for
his arrest. 4. (C) Assad said that several years ago majority leader Saad
Hariri had purportedly offered assistance to Tufayli to push
the case along, but dropped his efforts, citing French
resistance. Saad reportedly told Tufayli to wait until the
last French presidential election, but Tufayli has not
received a positive response to his appeals from Saad since
President Sarkozy took office. 5. (C) Arguing that the U.S. should push the GOL to give
Tufayli a trial, Assad said that Tufayli would be a valuable
asset in countering Hizballah's influence. He could direct
"a few thousand votes" in the Bekaa, Assad predicted, which
would be a blow against Hizballah. Assad acknowledged that
Tufayli has not yet departed from his anti-U.S. views.
(Note: Tufayli remains on the USG Terrorist Watch List. End
Note.) HIZBALLAH INFLUENCE IN THE SOUTH
-------------------------------- 6. (C) A prominent Shia from Nabatieh, Bitar reported that
Iran, through its "Iranian Organization for Rebuilding
Lebanon," is busy with improvements in the south, including
building streets, parking lots, etc. The organization
employs many Lebanese and pays them directly, he added.
Bitar explained that people in the south currently have no
assistance from the government, and are in need of social
services and medical aid. 7. (C) Bitar said he has always communicated with everyone,
naming Speaker Nabih Berri and Hizballah Secretary General
Hassan Nasrallah, in particular. He caveated that he has not
spoken with Nasrallah in some time. I am not switching sides
by joining Assad, he explained, just moving from an
apolitical stance to becoming more politically engaged. He
noted that Hizballah is currently unhappy with him because of
his friendship with Assad. 8. (C) Assad said that he is trying to work on the Shia
clerics in Nabatieh to part with Hizballah, but they are BEIRUT 00000571 002 OF 002 afraid in part because their salary is controlled by
Hizballah. Moreover, Assad continued, there is internal
pressure from the residents to continue supporting Hizballah.
He clarified that the Shia won't switch to March 14 if they
leave Hizballah, but instead are looking for another Shia
movement to support. PUSHING FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
--------------------------------------- 9. (C) Assad said that head of the National Bloc party Carlos
Edde (allied with March 14) and a March 14 MP are on his side
in terms of advocating for proportional representation in a
new electoral law. Assad said they are considering doing a
joint press conference, but fear creating friction within the
March 14 coalition. COMMENT
------- 10. (S/NF) This is the second time in two days Tufayli's name
was passed to us. Assad was vague about Tufayli's exit from
Hizballah. We know that Tufayli was expelled in 1998 from the
organization and has since tried to rejoin as late as 2005.
He was a founding member of Hizballah and served as Hizballah
Secretary General from 1989-1991. He is wanted by the SIPDIS
Lebanese authorities for killing soldiers and civilians in
1998 clashes. The list of his anti-U.S. rhetoric is long,
including praise for the 9/11 attacks and a desire to have
participated in the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks bombings. We
plan to ask the French about their own interest in Tufayli.
Our assessment is that Tufayli would not bring much Shia
strength to Ahmed al Assad's organization; indeed, with
Tufayli's reputation, legal problems, and reputation for
corruption, he would more likely bring discredit. End
comment. SISON VZCZCXRO9896
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RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2418
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000523 SIPDIS NOFORN
SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER, STATE FOR NEA/ELA, E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2018
TAGS: PTER, ECPS, PINR, LE, IR, SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HIZBALLAH GOES FIBER OPTIC REF: BEIRUT 490 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michele Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d) SUMMARY 1. (S) Requesting a special meeting with Charge,
Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh decried the
establishment of a complete fiber optics network by Hizballah
throughout Lebanon. The GOL has been sharing this
information widely among friends of Lebanon, to include the
governments of France, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE.
Hamadeh sees only two choices for the GOL: approach the UN
Security Council, or use the "cover" of March 14-friendly
municipalities to cut the lines. However, he questioned
whether the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Internal
Security Forces (ISF) have the "guts" to do so, given that
Hizballah already stated to Lebanese security officials that
it would view this as equal to an Israeli act of aggression,
and would then take action against the GOL. Hamadeh hopes
that Saad Hariri, now in Geneva, will return soon to Lebanon
so that March 14 can meet to formulate a strategy. End
summary. GOL HAS BEEN SHARING
HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC MAP,
REPORT WIDELY
------------- 2. (S) &Iran Telecom is taking over the country!8 were the
first words out of the mouth of Minister of
Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh when he met with Charge and
Econoff on April 16. He was referring to the discovery of a
complete fiber optic system (FiOS) installed by Hizballah
throughout Lebanon - reftel. In addition, Hizballah has
introduced Wi-Max in Beirut's southern suburbs. Hamadeh
pointed out that although Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation
(LBC) television had run a story the previous night about the
Hizballah FiOS network, it was already widely known. The LBC
story was not planted by the GOL, nor planned, but in
Hamadeh's opinion it was no bad thing to get the story out
there. Hamadeh himself has been sharing the news both within
the GOL and outside, with &friends,8 which includes the
Arab countries, the U.S., France (Sarkozy was &stunned") and
Terje Roed-Larsen of the UN. He briefed Bernard Kouchner,
Jean-David Levitte, Boris Bouillon and Michel Barnier while
in Paris. In Beirut he spoke to Charge Andre Parent of
France and Ambassador Abdul Aziz Khoja of Saudi Arabia. Saad
Hariri, when he heard, sent a private plane from Saudi Arabia
to pick up a copy of the map, which traces in detail the
route of the system, to share with Saudi King Abdullah and
Intelligence Chief Prince Mukrin bin Abdul-Aziz. PM Siniora
briefed the Jordanians and Emiratis, as well as Arab League
SYG Amr Musa on the network during his recent trip around the
region, Hamadeh confirmed. Within Lebanon Hamadeh says that
the first person he told, after the Prime Minister and Druze
leader Walid Jumblatt was Maronite Patriarch Sfeir. Hamadeh
described the strategic implications of the Hizballah plan,
which he says is targeting the Christian areas, despite a
denial of that by Hizballah. In addition to Hamadeh and PM
Siniora, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and Defense Minister
Michel Murr have been active in the GL information campaign
on the network. INTERFERENCE IN TELECOMS
LINKED TO NETWORK
----------------- 3. (S) While the confrontation over the FiOS system was
taking place with Hizballah, mobile telecommunications were
being subject to interference by Syria in the north, Israel
in the south and possibly by the UN at sea, according to
Hamadeh. The information about Israeli interference was
passed &unofficially8 by UNIFIL, since, in a recurring
complaint by Hamadeh during the conversation, the LAF has not
reported any problems officially. The Syrian interference is
similar to that occurring during the Nahr al-Barid fighting,
and highlights the ability of the Syrians to communicate
within Lebanon through non-Lebanese mobile systems. Because
the system in the part of Syria bordering on northern Lebanon
is a private company, MTM, Hamadeh believes that they offer
political cover to the Syrian government, who he nevertheless
believes is behind the problem. Hamadeh views these events
as part of the same strategic interference in Lebanon, both
internally and externally. Hamadeh has a map that delineates BEIRUT 00000523 002 OF 004 the interference, in an arc that runs from the north to the
south of Lebanon. MARCH 14 NEEDS TO MEET,
BUT SAAD SHOULD BE THERE
------------------------ 4. (S) Hamadeh said that he, the Prime Minister and Minister
of Defense Elias Murr are all danger, but he and Murr will
take the biggest risk in exposing the Hizballah FiOS network.
Hamadeh told the PM that he could not assume the risk alone
for a showdown with Hizballah. He also used the risk of
physical harm as a deterrent with Jumblatt, who wanted to
hold a press conference to expose the Hizballah system.
Hamadeh believes that this is a March 14 issue, and cannot be
resolved without the participation of Saad Hariri. Hamadeh
complained that there has not yet been either a March 14
meeting or a cabinet meeting to discuss this matter. He says
he asked for such discussions in a meeting with PM Siniora
April 15, and will raise it again when they meet April 16.
Hamadeh also discussed the issue with Larsen, whom he met
with recently in Paris, although he did not give Larsen the
map. If the GOL decides to raise the issue with the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) he will then provide the map,
said Hamadeh. HIZBALLAH RESPONSE
- DON'T TOUCH!
-------------- 5. (S) Hamadeh reported that LAF G-2 Brigadier General
Georges Khoury and ISF Major General Ashraf Rifi saw Wafiq
Safa, the Hizballah liaison to the Lebanese intelligence
services, together. Khoury asked Safa to take down two parts
of the network as a first step; Safa refused. Safa stated
that the network is part of Hizballah's ability to defend
Lebanon, and that Hizballah would regard any attack on the
network as an act of aggression. However, PM Siniora only
got a written report from Khoury ten days after the meeting,
Hamadeh complained. Even then, the report was unsigned and
thus returned to Khoury for signature. According to their
report, Hizballah argued that the PM, Hamadeh and Murr are
only raising the issue of the FiOS system in order to bring
up the issue of Hizballah weapons. Safa stated categorically
that the FiOS system is not up for discussion because it is a
key part of the Hizballah arsenal. Safa freely acknowledged
to Rifi and Khoury that the network exists. It could only be
discussed as part of a defense strategy, he said, adding that
the network has no commercial or trade implications. He
maintained that it does not penetrate the Christian areas. HIZBALLAH ASSERTIONS UNTRUE
----------------- 6. (S) Hamadeh believes both Hizballah assertions to be
untrue. He refutes the Hizballah claim that the system
exists solely to give them defensive communications
throughout the country, saying that there are "centrales"
or hubs in many villages along the route, and no doubt these
have lines running off to other villages and residences. He
also believes that Hizballah crews are only waiting for the
snows in the Christian regions of Metn and Kswaran to melt
before completing penetration of these regions from the east. WORK DONE UNDER
VARIOUS FORMS OF COVER
----------------- 7. (S) To complete the installations and at the same time
stay below the radar, Hamadeh says that Hizballah has used
the municipalities to issue local permits. For example, in
Sidon they are working under the cover provided by Abdel
Rahman Bizri, the mayor. In another case the Ministry of
Energy issued a permit for work that was "to reinforce
energy lines," although Hamadeh says that was clearly not
true. Hamadeh says that the whole of the Bekaa valley was
done with local permits, and installations were done by
different groups, each unaware of what the others were doing.
However, he also says that some of the work was done with
the knowledge of resigned Minister of Energy Fneish, a
Hizballah member. DISCOVERY AND REPORT
-------------------- 8. (S) The first official report was from the region of BEIRUT 00000523 003 OF 004 Chouifat, which reported installation of an unknown fiber
optic system, and asked the Minister of the Interior to stop
it. No one did anything because, in Hamadeh's opinion, they
"had no guts." At the time of the earlier exposure of the
Hizballah telephone lines running through Beirut, and even
along the wall of the French embassy, the GOL asked Hizballah
to remove those lines, which Hizballah did, and Hamadeh said
that he believed at the time that would be the end of the
network in the south. The full Ministry of
Telecommunications report on the system was compiled by
engineers in the ministry and others, including Shia
engineers from the south, who Hamadeh believes could be in
great danger because of the report. Once again Hamadeh
pointed out that there were no official reports yet from ISF
Major General Rifi or LAF G-2 Brigadier General Khoury. FUNDING FROM IRAN
----------------- 9. (S) The current installations, as per the map Hamadeh has
given us, shows lines running from Beirut, around both sides
of the airport, into the south below the Litani and back up
through the Bekaa valley to the far north. It covers the
Palestinian camps, and the Hizballah training camps in the
Bekaa, and is penetrating deep into the Christian Metn and
Ksarwan areas. Although Hamadeh says he has &a few names,8
he did not list the companies who are responsible for the
installation, but said that information would be made
available shortly. He cited the Iranian Fund for the
Reconstruction of Lebanon as the source of the funding. This
same group has been rebuilding roads and bridges since the
July 2006 war with Israel, and has been accused before of
installing telecommunications lines in parallel with new
roads. Hamadeh said that he wants to get the list of
companies involved and black list them with the GOL. STRATEGIC VICTORY
----------------- 10. (S) Hamadeh highlights the system as a strategic victory
for Iran, since it creates an important Iranian outpost in
Lebanon, bypassing Syria. He sees the value for the Iranians
as strategic, rather than technical or economic. The value
for Hizballah is the final step in creating a nation state.
Hizballah now has an army and weapons; a television station;
an education system; hospitals; social services; a financial
system; and a telecommunications system. As a sign of its
confidence Hizballah official Safa told Khoury and Rifi that
any move against the FiOS system would be taken as "an
Israeli attack" and dealt with accordingly. When Khoury and
Rifi pointed out that the people in the area might not accept
this and might show hostility to Hizballah in this case, Safa
replied, "We don't care; we will accept hostile reactions."
At that point, according to Hamadeh, the GOL decided it
needed to inform its friends and make a decision on the next
steps to be taken. HAMADEH PREPARES
INTERNAL CAMPAIGN
----------------- 11. (S) Meanwhile, Hamadeh is preparing a "very strong"
internal campaign. This campaign, he said, has the potential
to "destroy" Aoun and mobilize Christians, as well as
influence those Shia who are already beginning to worry about
Hizballah. He is waiting for a March 14 meeting to discuss
this campaign. Saad has apparently traveled to London and
Geneva this week, and is expected to be back in Riyadh by
4/20. Saad has been out of Lebanon for some several weeks
and it is not known when he will return. Hamadeh sees only
two choices for the GOL: approach the UN Security Council
directly, or take on Hizballah by cutting lines. But do the
Lebanese security forces have the "guts" for that, or are
they frightened by Safa's statement that those actions would
be considered an act of aggression, he wonders. 12. (S) Comment: Last year, when Hamadeh's
telecommunications ministry "discovered" the well-known
Hizballah telephone system, including the line strung along
the wall of the French embassy, he maintained that the GOL
would not tolerate the erosion of its "last monopoly" by
Hizballah, However, aside from the ceremonial cutting of the
French embassy line, there was no further action. This time
around, it appears that by sharing as widely as possible the
details of the plan, the GOL may hope that someone else will
take on the challenge. End cmment. BEIRUT 00000523 004 OF 004 SISON VZCZCXYZ1697
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 000331 SIPDIS NOFORN
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OVP FOR HANNAH/KAREM E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, SY, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: GEAGEA PROPOSES REVAMPING GOVERNMENT WITH
CHRISTIAN MINISTERS Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY
------- 1. (C) Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea conveyed his
thoughts to the Charge on the political impasse shortly
before departing on his three-week trip to the U.S. He
believes Lebanon should boycott the March 29-30 Arab League
summit in Damascus if no president is elected. At a minimum,
the summit should be held outside of Syria. On the electoral
law -- one of the obstacles to reaching an agreement on the
Arab League initiative -- Geagea pressed for proportional
representation, explaining that such a system would benefit
the March 14 Christians and weaken both Hizballah strongholds
and Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun's bloc. 2. (C) Proposing that March 14 enlarge its reach, Geagea said
he wanted to join forces with non-Hizballah Shia, and in
particular, Ahmad Assad, leader of Lebanon Intimaa
("Belonging"), an anti-Hizballah "third way Shia" political
movement. Geagea is still proposing to elect a president
with a half plus one majority, but, acknowledging the
proposal's lack of support, he advocated revamping Prime
Minister Fouad Siniora's government by replacing current
ministers in key positions with Christians. End summary. 3. (C) The Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met with Lebanese
Forces leader Samir Geagea on March 4, days before he departs
on a three-week trip to the U.S. Geagea advisors Elie Khoury
and Joseph Nehme attended the meeting. BOYCOTT THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT
------------------------------ 4. (C) Geagea opposed what he believes is Saudi Arabia's
current position on attendance at the March 29-30 Arab League
summit in Damascus: Saudi Arabia will attend if Syria
invites Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's government. Instead,
Geagea wants Lebanon and Saudi Arabia to condition attendance
on the election of a president in Lebanon, a position he
believes Druze leader Walid Jumblatt (with whom, we note,
Geagea is often at odds) would support. At a minimum, Geagea
wants the summit to be held outside of Syria, as an
extraordinary summit, so that it is not under Syrian
leadership. Geagea believes that Siniora would accept the
invitation if extended. However, he questions whether Syria
would invite only Siniora, who is Sunni, suspecting that
Damascus would include Shia Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri,
in order to avoid giving the impression that Syria recognizes
the Siniora government. MARCH 14 REJECTS MOUSSA'S LATEST IDEA
------------------------------------- 5. (C) Geagea reported that it was not clear whether Arab
League Secretary General Amr Moussa would return to Beirut
this week. He explained that Moussa's latest proposal to
majority leader Saad Hariri was to elect a president, then
form a national unity government in which the prime minister
is not from March 14, an idea which March 14 promptly
rejected. PRESSING FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
---------------------------------------- 6. (C) Revisiting Moussa's most recent attempt at
negotiations, Geagea said electoral reform remains an
obstacle, even within March 14. Geagea is calling for
proportional representation, a system he argues would
advantage March 14 Christians and break Hizballah
strongholds. Moreover, he added, proportional representation
would divide Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun's opposition
bloc by at least 50 percent. Another advantage could be the
election of March 14 Shia MPs, he posited. However, he
acknowledged, some of Saad Hariri's MPs may lose and Jumblatt
would need convincing, and requested that the U.S. urge them
to support proportional representation. (Note: Berri told
Charge in their February 25 meeting that he favored
proportional representation, although he advocated one large
electoral district, whereas Geagea favors small districts. End note.) ALLYING WITH NON-HIZBALLAH SHIA
------------------------------- 7. (C) Charge, having just met earlier in the day with Ahmad
Assad (septel), leader of Lebanon Intimaa ("Belonging"), an
anti-Hizballah political movement, inquired about Geagea's
relationship with him. Geagea responded that he has good
relations with Assad (who also supports proportional
representation, he noted) and that he was interested in
bringing him into the March 14 alliance. Claiming that Assad
is best positioned to lead a large Shia coalition, Geagea
sees potential in Assad but remarked that he needed funding.
He cautioned that Saad is opposed to Assad, in part because
the Saudis (Saad's allies) do not want to be at loggerheads
with Hizballah. Therefore, Geagea concluded, any U.S.
support for Assad should be kept quiet. According to Geagea,
when Assad ran for parliament as an independent, he received
15-20 percent of the votes cast in his district. (Note: we
are skeptical; our information is that he received far fewer.
End note.) 8. (C) Other potential Shia include Labor Minister Trad
Hamadeh's family and independent journalist Okab Saqr. That
was the extent of the possibilities, claimed Geagea. Geagea
said the U.S. aid to southern Lebanon was not successful at
shifting residents' allegiance away from Hizballah, and
therefore U.S. aid should go to Assad, in the south, as well
as to Christians in the north. REVAMP THE GOVERNMENT WITH
CHRISTIAN MINISTERS
-------------------------- 9. (C) Looking at the political impasse today, Geagea sees
three scenarios: 1) Status quo continues; 2) March 14 elect
a president with a half plus one majority; or 3) Revamp the
cabinet by placing Christians into key ministerial posts.
Geagea, still supporting the half plus one option, recognizes
that it is a risky move that lacks the necessary support at
this time. He suggested revamping the cabinet and putting
three representative Christians into important ministerial
posts such as Interior, Education, and Economy. As some of
these slots are currently filled by technocrats, Geagea
argued that since Lebanon is not really doing much as a
government these days, it does not need technical skills, but
rather symbolically important Christian representation. "Now
it is seen as a Hariri government; we want it to be seen as a
March 14 government," Geagea explained. USS COLE: THE U.S. IS IN A BIND
------------------------------- 10. (C) "You put yourself in big trouble," warned Geagea
referring to the presence of the USS Cole off Lebanon's
coast. He reasoned that if someone were to try something,
the U.S. will look bad if it does not react. Conversely, he
said, if the U.S. reacts, he is reminded of 1983. The U.S.
cannot sit idle, nor can it retreat at this point. He
suggested the U.S. could be more supportive if it imposed a
travel embargo on Syria, preventing all airlines from flying
in and out of Syria. Geagea opined that the Europeans would
be more amenable to an embargo after Imad Mugniyeh's
assassination, which provided the smoking gun to the world
that Syria harbors terrorists. 11. (S/NF) Geagea also provided the Charge with unconfirmed
intelligence describing an Iranian delivery to Syria of 15
submarines. Information was passed to DAO. COMMENT
------- 12. (C) We were surprised to hear about what appears to be
Geagea's relatively developed relationship with Assad and to
spot a copy of "The Shia Revival" by Vali Nasr on his desk.
Geagea and Berri's shared preference for proportional
representation is also interesting. End comment. SISON VZCZCXRO1305
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S E C R E T BEIRUT 000264 SIPDIS NOFORN
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TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, PHUM, PINR, SY, IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI PROVIDES ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE ON
MAKLOUF, SHAWKAT FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS REF: A. BEIRUT 215
B. DAMASCUS 70 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Michele J. Sison for Reasons: Se
ction 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S/NF) In the course of a February 11 meeting with the
Charge (Ref A), majority leader Saad Hariri and advisor
Ghattas Khoury provided anecdotal information regarding
alleged financial transactions of Rami Maklouf and Syrian
Directory of Military Intelligence Asef Shawket. They
alleged that Maklouf had assisted Syrian President Bashar
Asad in moving funds out of Syria to Dubai. Most of the
money was funneled through the Damascus airport he said.
Maklouf also allegedly owns a hotel in Romania and other real
estate in Dubai. Shawkat reportedly facilitated the transfer
of $50 million from Qatar in Free Patriotic Movement leader
General Michel Aoun's OTV, in the names of Aoun's daughters. 2. (S/NF) As they have before, Hariri and Khoury urged that
the USG designate Maklouf and Shawkat as a means of punishing
Syria for it's interference in Lebanon and because their
activities promote corruption.
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000251 SIPDIS NOFORN
SIPDIS NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/HARDING E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, UNSC, PTER, SY, IS, LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: PM GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT'S STRONG
LETTER OF SUPPORT REF: BEIRUT 00175 Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary
-------- 1. (C) Under Secretary of Defense Edelman delivered the
President's personal letter to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora
during their meeting in Beirut on February 12. The Prime
Minister was grateful for the letter, saying he was pleased
to see such "strong and firm support on many important
issues." The Prime Minister reached out directly to KSA
officials, who informed him that the Saudi contribution for
the Special Tribunal "had likely already happened." The
Prime Minister asked for the international community to join
together for clear and united statements of support for the
March 14th majority and immediate presidential elections. He
asked for additional economic support and called recent
Israeli actions along the southern border unhelpful.
Finally, he acknowledged that the Palestinian refugee camps
still present a security challenge. He asked for
international donors to support the reconstruction of the
Nahr al-Barid camp in order to provide "a new model for camps
in Lebanon. End Summary. Grateful for the President's Letter
----------------------------- 2. (C) Prime Minister Siniora paused at the opening of his
February 11 meeting with Ambassador and USD/P Eric Edelman to
carefully read the text of the personal letter from the
President that Edelman had just handed to him. The PM
acknowledged that the letter was coming at an important time,
as March 14th prepares to commemorate the third anniversary
of PM Rafik Hariri's assassination on February 14. 3. (C) The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for the
letter and said that he had no doubt about the President's
personal commitment to Lebanon. However, he was anxious to
"move forward with a literal translation of this support on
the ground," mentioning the need for continued support for
Lebanon's military and the Special Tribunal. PM Reaches Out to KSA Officials for Tribunal Funding Update
----------------------------- 4. (C) During his last meeting with the Ambassador (reftel),
the Prime Minister said he would follow up personally with
the KSA for contributions to the Special Tribunal. When
asked by the Ambassador for an update on his efforts, he said
that he had personally spoken with Prince Saud al Faisal, the
KSA Foreign Minister, about the issue and sent a reminder on
February 11. With the U.S. delegation still in the room, he
phoned Saudi Prince Bandar for an update. At the conclusion
of the conversation, he told us that "The Saudis want to do
this, but they want to do it without noise." He did not
elaborate on this comment. 5. (C) He also took a call from Prince Mukrin bin Abdel al
Aziz, Director of Saudi General Intelligence. At the end of
this conversation, Siniora told us that he had been told that
the Saudi transfer of funds had "most likely already
occurred." Siniora asked Prince Mukrin for his assistance in
following up on the pledges from both the Kuwait and the UAE.
(Note: After this meeting, DCM spoke with Hariri senior
advisor, Ghattas Khoury, who said that Saad Hariri planned to
personally call Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and Abu
Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed on the evening of
February 12 to urge formal and rapid tranfer of their
donations into the UN Special Tribunal accounts. End Note.) Lebanese Majority Has Already Compromised Too Much
-------------------------------- 6. (C) As it had been four months since his last conversation
with Ambassador Edelman, PM Siniora provided an overview of
recent events "to put things in a Lebanese perspective." He
said the majority has already sacrificed and compromised too
much. They have shelved the right to use their "50 plus 1"
majority to elect a president and they have agreed to support
a presidential candidate who comes from outside of their own BEIRUT 00000251 002 OF 003 cadre of March 14th loyalists. The Prime Minister pointed
out that March 14th had gone along with the French initiative
and said, "We were let down." 7. (C) Siniora reiterated that the opposition still insisted
on obtaining veto power in the new government and they were
holding the presidential election hostage until their demand
was met. "We want the blackmail to end," emphasized Siniora. Lebanon Needs Allies to Speak with One Voice
------------------------------ 8. (C) In Siniora's opinion, the many "sidebar" consultations
with Syria to date have failed to produce meaningful results.
"The Syrians are masters at seeing light between the cracks
and playing allies against each other. If the Syrians can
see any room for negotiation, they will bring a situation to
the brink in pursuit of the best possible deal for
themselves. We have to stop the blackmail and escalating
accusations. Dialogue should not take the form of violence
in the streets - nobody wants that." 9. (C) Siniora would like the Arabs, Europeans, Russians and
Americans to deliver one coordinated message to the Syrians,
which he admitted is difficult to do. He emphasized the
potential for Russia to play a positive role, stating that
they had perhaps the greatest ability to influence internal
decision-making in both Syria and Iran. Siniora was pleased
with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Saltanov's statement
earlier this week which contained clear language calling for
an immediate election in Lebanon. King Abdullah had been in
Moscow earlier this week and reported to Siniora that Lebanon
had been an agenda item during his meetings at the Kremlin. 10. (C) Siniora also confirmed that Lebanon had not yet
received an invitation from Syria to the March Arab League
Summit in Damascus, although it is clear that there is no way
for Syria to get around the issue of Lebanon's participation.
The PM doubts that Syria will invite him to participate as
head of state, despite the fact that he is currently carrying
out executive functions in accordance with the Lebanese
constitution. The alternative is that there will be an empty
seat behind the Lebanese flag on the table during the
meeting. Neither option seems palatable to Arab League
member states, Siniora said. GOL Needs Assistance to Face Challenges
------------------------------ 11. (S/NF) Siniora said that he would shortly be traveling to
Kuwait, London, Paris and Berlin to seek additional political
and economic assistance for Lebanon. He also said he had
approached the KSA and UAE, but told us in a resigned tone,
"I've spoken to them and visited them frequently. These
things take time." He wondered aloud if these allies were
starting to become ashamed of helping Lebanon. "Well, we are
not," Ambassador Edelman emphasized. He told the Prime
Minister that he would be discussing with Deputy Prime
Minister and Defense Minister Murr a new USG donation of USD
7.4 million in additional military assistance. He would also
be providing the first results of some new intelligence
sharing and proposing ways to build on existing LAF training
programs for future cooperative programs. 12. (C) Prime Minister Siniora shared that he had a good
working relationship with both the World Bank and the IMF,
proudly telling us that the GOL was exceeding expectations
despite the current challenges it faces. Siniora, a former
Finance Minister, then launched into some statistics. The
rising price of oil has hit Lebanon hard and the GOL, which
subsidizes electricity production, is losing USD 1.2 billion
per year. After Paris III, the GOL also agreed to reduce
import taxes and Siniora said that they have to contend with
USD 600 million per year on lost fuel excise taxes. He said
he has been speaking with two countries to arrange for less
expensive oil purchasing agreements. Kuwait has agreed to
sell Lebanon oil at the same price it sells to the U.S.,
which Siniora claims "is not cheap." Siniora also plans to
dispatch a delegation to Iraq to negotiate a purchase of
crude oil which could be shipped to Lebanon via Turkey. "Syrians Use Sheba'a Farms to Justify the Presence of BEIRUT 00000251 003 OF 003 Hizballah"
----------------------------- 13. (C) The Prime Minister also raised one of his frequent
talking points -- the need to find a resolution for the
Sheba'a Farms issue. He asked the USG to "do something
helpful. Don't make us have to deal with the Syrians to find
a solution for this. They like having this bleeding wound on
the border. They use it to justify the preence of
Hizballah." Israelis "Not Helpful" forStability in Lebanon
---------------------------- 14. (C) Ambassador Edelman mentioned that he would shortly be
meeting with Israeli interlocutors who, in general, respected
the work of the Siniora government given the current
difficult challenges that it faces. Siniora said Israeli
actions continued to exacerbate tensions in southern Lebanon,
specifically highlighting the continued illegal overflights,
the lack of cooperation in identifying the location of
cluster munitions from the 2006 war, and the recent
kidnapping of shepherds and shooting death by IDF forces
firing into Lebanese territory. He also said that Israeli
representatives were "unhelpful" in UN-led border
coordination meetings, especially on border demarcation
issues. According to Siniora, all of these tiny things
combined to put great pressure on the GOL's ability to
maintain stability in southern Lebanon. Palestinian Camps Still Sources of Trouble
--------------------------- 15. (C) In response to Ambassador Edelman's request for
information about the Ayn al Hulwah Palestinian refugee camp,
the Prime Minister acknowledged that this and other camps
continue to be sources of trouble. The Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) have been able to exert some control in the camps and
to make offenders aware of the GOL's determination to
maintain order, but the PM said the camps are still, in
reality, microstates. 16. (C) When asked how the GOL would address this issue, the
Prime Minister responded by saying that a new model for camps
was needed in Lebanon. He called on international donors to
contribute to the rebuilding of the Nahr al-Barid refugee
camp. "We must show the people progress and give them a
sense of hope for a better future. We paid a terrible price
to gain control of that camp. We have to make it mean
something." Conclusion
----------
17. (C) The Prime Minister ended that meeting by telling
Ambassador Edelman that the current political crisis was
"bigger than Lebanon." He said that, if not resolved
quickly, the Lebanese model will have profound implications
on "societal openess in the rest of the region.
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SUBJECT: LEBANON: THEORIES ABOUT MUGHNIEH'S ASSASSINATION REF: TD 314-011416-08 Classified By: DCM William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY
-------- 1. (C) Two days after the February 12 Damascus car bomb
attack that killed senior Hizballah commander Imad Mughnieh,
theories abound in Beirut on who was behind the assassination
and why. The timing of the killing also cannot be ignored,
occurring just two days before the third anniversary of the
assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri and a March 14
commemorative rally in downtown Beirut. With tensions in
Lebanon already high -- and both sides hardening their
positions -- due to the ongoing political impasse, many
Lebanese are predicting that Lebanon will pay the price for
Mughnieh's death. 2. (C) The assassination of a figure who was an icon for the
Lebanese Shia resistance, but one of the U.S.' and Israel's
most sought after terrorist fugitives, raises questions about
who wanted Mughnieh dead now, and why. While most regional
finger pointing is directed at Israel, with the U.S. coming a
close second, several local political and intelligence
sources believe the Syrian regime had good reasons to rid
itself of Mughnieh. 3. (C) As the Hizballah controlled southern suburbs of
Beirut are in deep mourning for the February 14 burial of
one of their own, reaction from members of the pro-government
March 14 bloc ranges from private satisfaction to the sober
condolence statement issued by Future Movement leader Saad
Hariri. However, the possibility that March 14 could have
been involved has also surfaced in the rumor mill. There is
widespread concern that retaliation will not be good for
Lebanon. End summary. CONCURRENT MAJORITY AND
OPPOSITION MEMORIALS
----------------------- 4. (C) On a dreary and wet February 14 afternoon Hizballah
buried its hero, Imad Mughnieh, in a mass funeral service
that included speeches by Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah and
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. A few hours
earlier, and just a short drive from Mughnieh's funeral, the
pro-government March 14 bloc held a mass rally in Martyrs'
Square commemorating the third anniversary of the
assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri. The mass gathering
of March 14 supporters (claims of attendance ranged from
100,000 to a million supporters) was an attempt to
re-energize the majority's base and regain the political
initiative against the opposition. Nasrallah vowed "open
war" with the "Zionists," pledging to carry out operations
against Israel outside of Lebanon in retaliation for
Mughnieh's death. The speechmaking at the peaceful March 14
rally focused on the need for Lebanese "consensus and
agreement," and the immediate election of a president. Among
the many speakers, only Druse leader Walid Jumblatt came out
tough on Syria and its opposition allies, vowing that Lebanon
will not be "handed to Damascus or to the black
Syrian-Iranian world." MARCH 14'S PUBLIC CONDEMNATION:
MORE THAN CROCODILE TEARS?
------------------------- 5. (C) On February 13, March 14 leader MP Saad Hariri
publicly denounced Mughnieh's assassination and offered his
condolences to Hizballah SYG Hassan Nasrallah. In an LBCI
television interview the same day, Hariri agreed with
Hizballah's accusation that Israel was behind the killing.
However, Hariri also hinted at a Syrian role when he noted
that Mughnieh was killed in Damascus, near an Iranian school,
and in an area controlled by Syrian intelligence. 6. (C) The day of the assassination. March 14 SYG Fares
Suaid spoke of Mughnieh's death as though it were a lesson
for Hizballah. Namely, Hizballah should realize that its
only protector and guarantor is the Lebanese state and the
Lebanese army and not/not the Syrian security apparatus and
its arsenal. 7. (C) Meanwhile Druse leader and March 14 member Walid
Jumblatt, believes that either the Israelis, for obvious BEIRUT 00000237 002 OF 002 reasons, or the Syrians, for reasons unknown, eliminated
Mughnieh. In any case, Jumblatt, candid as usual, called
Mughnieh's death "good news." 8. (C) A number of majority politicians, including former
Lebanese Ambassador to the U.S. Simon Karam and National
Liberal Party leader Dory Chamoun, believe Syria liquidated
Moughnieh as a "gift to the Americans." Both hoped that the
deal will not turn out to be at Lebanon's expense. 9. (C) Minister of the Interior Hassan Sabaa told
Ambassador that he was relieved that Mughnieh was not killed
on Lebanese soil, otherwise March 14 would have been accused
of conspiring with Israel against Hizballah. Sabaa,
undecided as to the identity of the perpetrator, commented it
could be Syria wanting to send a message to Hizballah or to
the U.S., or even the result of a split within Hizballah.
He, too, expressed concern that Lebanon could pay a price in
case the message was directed to the U.S. as reminder that
the U.S should deal with Syria over the presidential election
and Hizballah. 10. (C) Another theory in the Beirut rumor mill has it that
the Saudis and the Hariri family collaborated with Syrian
Sunni jihadis to deal a blow to the opposition and their
allies Syria and Iran. This idea is based on previous
allegations that Saad Hariri and Saudi Arabia were involved
in arming Sunni militants in an effort to counter Hizballah. ISF OFFICIALS SEE BASHAR'S HAND
------------------------------- 11. (S/NF) Mid-level officials from Lebanese Internal
Security Forces (ISF) told emboffs they believe Syrian forces
affiliated with President Bashar al-Asad may be responsible
for the assassination in an effort to force a compromise in
the ongoing political impasse by lessening pressure on Syria
(Ref A). The officials further speculated that the attack
would be a severe blow to Hizballah, leading to extensive
confusion and lack of cohesion. They attribute their
assessment to alleged tension between al-Asad and his
military intelligence chief Asef Shawkat resulting from a
disagreement between the spouses of the two men. The ISF
officials further noted that al-Asad was becoming
increasingly independent, sidelining
previously trusted advisors such as Shawkat. SOME OPPOSITION OBSERVERS
DOUBT ISRAELI "GUILT"
------------------------- 12. (C) While most observers in the Lebanese opposition
rallied behind Hizballah's accusation against Israel,
Aoun-bloc MP Ghassan Mokheiber noted privately to emboffs
that it was bizarre that Moughnieh was killed after stepping
out of a Syrian intelligence office, adding that Mughnieh's
death represented a big challenge for Hizballah. Mokheiber
commented that the days ahead would probably reveal the
nature of a possible "deal" made.
SISON | 
Sacha Gervasi and Jessica de Rothschild (Website for this image)
Geri Halliwell (Website for this image) 
Sir Evelyn de Rothschild....
Lynn Forester (centre)
